Kimberly D. Krawiec
Sullivan and Cromwell Professor of Law, University of Virginia-Main Campus
Chapter Member: Virginia SSN
Areas of Expertise:
Connect with Kimberly
About Kimberly
Krawiec's current research analyzes "taboo trades" exchanges that are contested by society and, in some cases, forbidden altogether. She has written on commercial surrogacy, egg and sperm markets, and sex work. At the moment, much of her work is on incentives for organ donation. Although financial incentives are part of the menu, she is most interested in non-financial incentives, such as kidney swaps, NEAD chains, and priority systems that provide an incentive to donate. Another area of her research centers on the regulation of financial markets and business organizations. At present, she is examining the administrative process surrounding the Volcker Rule, a complex and highly-contested provision of Dodd-Frank.
Contributions
How Best to Encourage Organ Donation
Key Findings Brief,
In the News
Kimberly D. Krawiec's research on , "If NFL Players Can Get Paid, so Should Kidney Donors," Value Walk, May 7, 2018.
"Why Ban Payment to Kidney Donors, but Not Football Players?," Kimberly D. Krawiec (with ), Herald-Sun, February 2, 2018.
Kimberly D. Krawiec quoted on the Sherman Act, "Lawsuit Accuses Fertility Groups of Illegal Price-Fixing of Human Eggs" Bangor Daily News, October 11, 2015.
Guest to discuss price fixing in the fertility industry on Legal Broadcast Network, Kimberly D. Krawiec, August 4, 2015.
"What Does Corporate Boardroom Diversity Accomplish?," Kimberly D. Krawiec, New York Times, April 1, 2015.
Kimberly D. Krawiec's research on financial reform discussed by "Duke Law School’s Kim Krawiec and the Sausage Making of Financial Reform," Corporate Crime Reporter, September 26, 2013.
Publications
"A Primer on Kidney Transplantation: Anatomy of the Shortage" (with ). Law and Contemporary Problems 77, no. 3 (forthcoming).
Offers an exploration of the kidney transplant shortage problem and suggests that it may be time to offer financial incentives for kidney donation.
"Reverse Transplant Tourism" (with ). Law and Contemporary Problems 77, no. 3 (forthcoming).
Proposes a novel form of kidney swap, which we label “Reverse Transplant Tourism
"Don’t ‘Screw Joe the Plummer’: The Sausage-Making of Financial Reform" Arizona Law Review 55 (2013): 53-103.
Examines agency level activity during the pre-proposal rulemaking phase – a time period about which little is known, despite its importance to policy outcomes.
"Custom, Contract, and Kidney Exchange" (with ). Duke Law Journal 62 (2012): 645-670.
Examines a case in which the organizational and logistical demands of a novel form of organ exchange (the nonsimultaneous, extended, altruistic donor [NEAD] chain) do not map cleanly onto standard cultural schemas for either market or gift exchange, resulting in sociological ambiguity and legal uncertainty.
"Price and Pretense in the Baby Market" in Baby Markets: Money and the New Politics of Creating Families, edited by Michelle Bratcher Goodwin (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 41-55.
Demonstrates that the legal baby trade is a global market in which prospective parents pay, scores of intermediaries profit, and the demand for children is clearly differentiated by age, race, special needs, and other consumer preferences, with prices ranging from zero to over one hundred thousand dollars. Explores the costs of societal pretense that legal baby markets do not exist.
"Sunny Samaritans and Egomaniacs: Price-Fixing in the Gamete Market" Law & Contemporary Problems 72 (2009): 59-90.
Considers the market structure of the human egg (or “oocyte”) donation business, particularly the presence of anti-competitive behavior by the fertility industry, including horizontal price-fixing of the type long considered per se illegal in other industries.