Courtenay R. Conrad

Argues that although dictators face domestic incentives to ratify the UN Convention Against Torture (CAT) and nonetheless engage in torture are moderated in countries with effective domestic judiciaries.

Finds empirical evidence that dictatorships generating higher audience costs experience as much terrorism as democracies, while autocracies generating lower audience costs face fewer attacks than their democratic counterparts.

Finds that democratic institutions have a moderating effect on the positive relationship between unearned revenues and human rights violations. Our results suggest that pursuing democracy is a useful way to reduce political violence, both directly and indirectly, even in the presence of a resource curse.

Argues that international human rights treaties have no effect on government repression in countries where leaders are insecure in office, but have a positive effect on rights protection in countries headed by secure leaders.

Makes the case that dictators buy off some types of domestic political opposition with material concessions and liberalize when they face other types of domestic opposition. Because dictators often make decisions facing environmental constraints, however, I also argue that financial conditions can limit a dictator’s ability to respond beneficently to the opposition.

Shows that some liberal democratic institutions change the probability that leaders support the creation of institutions that discourage jailers and interrogators from engaging in torture, thus increasing the probability of a state terminating its use of torture. But states rarely terminate the use of torture when they face a threat.