Cynthia L. Rogers

Constructs a policy leadership index to classify jurisdictions as leaders or followers. Shows how asymmetric leader-follower dynamics characterize horizontal tax competition over the three decades that follow by using models that control for vertical tax competition effects.

Explores the relationship between the rising use of economic development incentives (EDI) and rising income inequality within U.S. states. Provides a normative argument for reducing inequality as a policy goal, an issue commonly ignored in empirical applications of inequality. Discusses the channels through which EDI policy can influence equality outcomes in a regional context. Estimates panel data models for 41 states from 2000 to 2009 using direct measures of EDI and three common measures of income inequality.

Considers whether the duty of care standard used in corporate governance should be applied to the public decision-making context regarding economic development incentives.

Investigates the impact of an increase in the state sales tax rate on the tax rates of local communities in an environment where both state and local governments impose sales taxes. Suggests that rural communities are negatively impacted by having a longer period between tax rate increases after a state sales tax increase. The larger, regional centers do not respond the same.

Argues that the standard tax haven variable is endogenous to the error term in a typical growth regression.

Investigates the relationship between employment growth and state-level policies aimed at attracting investments from foreign firms. Finds a positive relationship, using data from 50 states between 1999 and 2008, find a positive relationship.

Uses Oklahoma data from 1993 to 2006 to find that the ability of municipal governments to control sales tax revenues is affected by spillover effects both from other municipalities and from counties.

Presents a simple and generalizable procedure for estimating state-level marginal tax rates and provides estimates for all fifty states for the years 1977 to 2004. Fiscal policy-makers generally believe that marginal tax rates are influential drivers of economic activity.

Shows how, due to measurement errors, using the concept of “tax burden” (defined as the ratio of total tax revenues over personal income) is likely to produce misleading conclusions about the influence of tax policy.

Discusses how “quasi-experimental control group analysis,” used to analyze a broad range of public policies including taxes and public infrastructure investments, attempts to replicate traditional experimental design by comparing places in which a policy has been implemented with carefully matched places in which it has not been implemented. This article establishes conditions under which this approach can outperform conventional regression analysis.