Katherine Bersch
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About Katherine
Bersch studies democratic quality and governance reform in developing countries, with a focus on environmental policy, public sector capacity, and citizen-state relations. She is co-founder of the Global Survey of Public Servants and an investigator with the Governance Project at Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. Her award-winning book, When Democracies Deliver, examines how democratic regimes improve governance in Latin America. Her current project compares presidential and bureaucratic control over environmental policy in Brazil and the United States, with broader implications for state capacity and democratic accountability.
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Investigates how bureaucratic autonomy affects governance quality, building on Fukuyama’s theory that the relationship may be curvilinear and influenced by state capacity. Findings suggest that the impact of bureaucratic autonomy on governance depends on the specific type of autonomy (independence vs. discretion) and the broader institutional context.
Introduces the Global Survey of Public Servants (GSPS), a global initiative to collect and harmonize large-scale, comparable survey data on public servants. The surveys measure both employee attitudes (such as job satisfaction and motivation), and their experience with management practices (such as recruitment and performance management).
Reviews the literature on bureaucratic autonomy both in US administrative law and in political science. Finds that the administrative law and social science literatures on this topic approach it very differently, arguing that both fields would benefit from engaging more with each other.
Argues that administrative political appointees (APAs) beneath the ministerial level play a crucial role in building and maintaining executive-legislative coalitions. Findings highlight that such appointments are a key tool in the president’s “toolbox” for maintaining legislative support and should be more central in models of legislative-executive bargaining.
Argues that timely, up-to-date surveys of public sector workers are essential tools for identifying problems, resolving bottlenecks, and enabling public sector workers to operate effectively during and in response to the challenges posed by the pandemic.
Introduces the concept of “infrastructure dominance” to examine whether China follows a distinct model in Latin American infrastructure development. Findings show that China’s involvement in projects varies based on the existing institutional constraints of the host country.
Offers a dynamic framework for assessing the effectiveness and durability of policy change. Argues that gradual, incremental reforms—rather than sweeping overhauls—are more effective in building transparency, accountability, and strong institutions.
Responds to calls for better measurement of bureaucratic characteristics by mapping Brazil's federal agencies along three dimensions: capacity, autonomy, and partisan dominance. Offers a proof of concept showing how these agency-level characteristics relate to corruption.
Challenges the common view that dramatic, top-down reforms are the best way to improve governance in developing countries, arguing that gradual, incremental changes ("problemsolving" reforms) are more effective and sustainable.