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Michael S. Latner

Director of Research on Democratic Reform, Charles Hamilton Houston Institute, Harvard Law School; Professor of Political Science, California Polytechnic State University-San Luis Obispo
Chapter Member: Bay Area SSN
Areas of Expertise:

About Michael

Professor Latner's research focuses on electoral system design, voting rights, and representation. He has co-authored two books on redistricting and gerrymandering in the United States, in addition to numerous scientific articles, expert witness testimony, and electoral system engineering and consulting for local and state governments. He currently serves as Director of Research on Democratic Reform at Harvard Law School's Chharles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice.

Contributions

No Jargon Podcast

In the News

Opinion: "California Students Can Help Renew Our Democratic Spirit. Here’s How," Michael S. Latner, CALmatters, April 5, 2019.
Opinion: "In its Latest Decision, the Supreme Court Has Got it Wrong when it Says that Partisan Gerrymandering Only Hurts Voters in Specific Districts," Michael S. Latner (with Anthony J. McGann and Charles Anthony Smith), London School of Economics - US Centre, July 25, 2018.
Opinion: "How the Supreme Court Made Gerrymandering Worse," Michael S. Latner (with David Daley), Daily News, June 25, 2018.
Opinion: "Supreme Court Ignores Science, Enables Voter Purging, But Data May Have Final Say," Michael S. Latner, Union of Concerned Scientists.

Publications

"Diagnosing Electoral Integrity" in Electoral Integrity in America: Securing Democracy, edited by Pippa Norris, Sarah Cameron and Thomas Wynter, (Oxford University Press, 2018), 60-79.

Examines how the integrity of an election can be broken down into measurements. Quantifies the legitimacy, fairness, and accuracy of an election.

"The Calculus of Consensus Democracy" (with Anthony J. McGann). Comparative Political Studies 46, no. 7 (2013): 823-850.

Presents a theory of comparative political institutions based on the concept of consensus democracy and social choice theory. Argues that “consensus democracy” is not a special form of democracy characterized by mutual vetoes, but rather the simplest form of democracy, referred to as PR-majority rule. Constructs a typology of political institutions based on differences with this simple model.

Gerrymandering in America: The House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, and the Future of Popular Sovereignty (with Anthony J. McGann, Charles Anthony Smith, and Alex Keena). (Cambridge University Press, 2016).

Reveals how when the Supreme Court decided partisan gerrymandering was beyond judicial oversight, it radically altered the constraints on redistricting and allowed for greater partisan bias.