SoRelle Wyckoff Gaynor
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About SoRelle
Gaynor researches and teaches courses on the U.S. Congress, American politics, and political methodology. Her work has been published or is forthcoming in Journal of Politics, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Electoral Studies and more. She is an author for the textbook Congress Explained, and her own book, Echo Chambers: How Partisan Communication Took Over Congress is currently in production with University of Chicago Press.
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Examines how members of Congress increasingly rely on party leaders’ talking points when communicating with the public, rather than explaining legislation in their own words or focusing on local district concerns. Argues that this shift has helped national partisan messaging dominate congressional politics, deepening political polarization and changing how Americans understand what Congress does.
Explores how lawmakers adjust the ideological tone of their messaging depending on who they are speaking to, such as constituents, party allies, or broader national audiences. Finds that legislators often present themselves differently across platforms and audiences, revealing how political communication is carefully tailored to strategic goals rather than remaining fully consistent.
Examines whether informal social ties in Congress—specifically through the annual congressional baseball game—help lawmakers work together across party lines. Finds that members who played on the baseball teams were more likely to collaborate on legislation afterward, suggesting that personal relationships can still encourage bipartisan cooperation even in a polarized Congress.
Looks at how members of Congress rely on talking points and messaging created by party leaders when explaining legislation to the public. Finds that Republicans, especially in the House, are more likely than Democrats to repeat party-centered messages, which helps strengthen partisan division and gives party leaders more influence over how politics is discussed.
Looks at how informal political groups inside Congress (“intraparty caucuses,” like the Freedom Caucus or Progressive Caucus) help members build financial support networks. Finds that lawmakers are more likely to donate campaign money to fellow caucus members, while party leaders are less likely to financially support those members, suggesting these caucuses give politicians an alternative power base within their party.