Stuart Shapiro

Argues that the regulatory process and its influence on the economy is widely misunderstood by the public and policy-makers alike. Concludes that the politics of regulatory reform is much more about politics than it is about regulation.

Argues that a simpler analysis of more alternatives conducted earlier in the process can resuscitate it as a tool to inform policy. Offers possible remedies which include intensifying or relaxing subsequent review of proposed rules, which raise the cost of circumventing the reform or lower the cost of following it.

Addresses the question of when different forms of comprehensive analysis (cost-benefit analysis, risk assessment, and environmental impact assessment) make a difference in policy decisions.  Finds that law, politics and bureaucracy are the key constraints on analysis and proposes reforms to make analysis more effective.

Discusses the failures of four regulatory reform statutes to meaningfully change regulatory policy. By matching the legislative history of these statutes with their actual performance, demonstrates that a lack of true will for regulatory reform in Congress and the presidency has led to loopholes in reform statutes that have subsequently hampered their implementation.

Uses a unique data set on the volume of regulation in 28 states as well as some detailed case studies to examine why politicians continually propose and enact changes to the process by which regulatory agencies produce regulations. Concludes that these “regulatory reforms” do little to affect regulations but allow legislators and governors to take credit for dealing with the perceived economic impacts of regulation.

Examines the implementation of the Paperwork Reduction Act which affects every attempt by federal agencies to collect information from the public. The report concluded that the Act has been largely ineffective and should be retooled to focus on the most burdensome collections.

Demonstrates that there is little relationship between the economic analyses used to inform regulatory decisions and the net benefits of the regulation. Instead, political factors appear to have a more significant relationship with regulatory impacts.

Compares data on how two ideologically distinct presidential administrations used the regulatory process. While each administration had very different regulatory goals, the process appears nearly identical under Presidents Clinton and Bush.