Albert B. Wolf

Lays out four options for U.S. grand strategy towards Iran: rollback, offshore balancing, retrenchment, and engagement.

Investigates the nuclear postures available to Israel in the wake of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and the P5+1.

 Finds that the general public disapproved of the Olmert government’s backing down after issuing threats against Hezbollah, and that public disapproval greatly weakened the government. However, leaders can still retain office when they face multiple audiences (or principals), by cutting side deals with other parties in parliament.

Discusses domestic political signaling and Israel's relations with it's Arab neighbors.

Argues that, when autocrats lose, they are vulnerable to being overthrown by mass audiences. In order for them (in this case, the Arab Street) to hold dictators to account, three conditions must hold. Critics must be able to identify and coordinate with one another; they must view fighting and losing a war as a sign of failure; and, finally, protests must pose a threat to a dictator's hold onto power.

Advances a new argument to account for the relationship between international cooperation and authoritarian political survival. When dictators make peace with their states' enduring rivals or with states with whom they have fought at least six times in the preceding 20 years, they create a focal point for their critics in the general public to rally around. This makes it easier for members of the general public to reveal their true preferences and protest against the incumbent regime, allowing members of the opposition to portray themselves as genuine patriots.

Responds to Fareed Zakaria's regime vulnerability critique of Myths of Empire.