Jeff Kucik

Introduces new data on compliance, measured as whether losing countries make tangible domestic reforms to bring policy in line with WTO rulings. We show that compliance is significantly less likely in disputes with more third parties. Uses a variety of estimation techniques, including controlling for nonrandom selection into legal rulings, we demonstrate a robust correlation between third party participation and noncompliance.  Highlights a risk of stringent enforcement and suggest that compliance problems threaten to undercut the operation of the multilateral trade regime.

Argues that government turnover undermines states’ commitments to liberalization, even if they have already signed an international agreement meant to constrain their behavior. Tests this argument using data on realized trade in the presence of around 300 preferential trade agreements (PTAs) since 1970.

Describes the role of precedent in the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to explain how precedent can affect compliance with the decisions of international courts and tribunals (ICs). Makes two main contributions. Shows that there can be precedent without a formal stare decisis rule. In theory the AB has a rule against binding precedent.

Provides a careful analysis of trade flows in the wake of WTO disputes. Finds that WTO disputes do not increase the respondent country's imports of the products at issue.

Argues that case law increases the likelihood of early settlement. Helps explain why fifty percent of WTO cases end prior to a formal ruling.