Joseph Blocher

Explains and criticizes the Supreme Court's reliance on "text, history, and tradition" to evaluate the constitutionality of modern laws, especially those involving guns. Proposes solutions such as defining principles of similarity between historical and modern laws, addressing differences between past and present contexts, and recognizing judicial limitations in historical inquiry and regulatory changes.

Explores how the Supreme Court increasingly relies on historical facts in constitutional litigation, driven by the rise of originalism and similar interpretative methods. Suggests that while originalism claims to resolve constitutional questions based on historical facts, these facts are often not litigated in accordance with standard practices for fact-finding (introduction at trial, expert testimony, adversarial testing, deference on appeal, etc.).

Argues that the traditional view of gun regulation focusing solely on preventing physical harm is incomplete and skews constitutional analysis of gun rights. Highlights how guns can also be used to intimidate and threaten, necessitating government regulation to protect public safety and the democratic public sphere. Emphasizes that recognizing these broader societal impacts of gun regulation is essential for ensuring equal security and liberties in a diverse constitutional democracy.

Explores implications of federal policy that places certain restrictions on gun ownership for veterans.

Analyzes over one thousand court opinions on the Second Amendment since the DC v. Heller case was decided in 2008. Establishes empirically the nature of legal opinion on the Second Amendment in a changing constitutional environment.

Summarizes and analyzes the history of constitutional theory behind the Second Amendment, in the aftermath of the 2008 DC v. Heller Supreme Court case.

Analyzes "gun neutral" law and cases in civil and criminal law where firearms are an incidental part of alleged conduct.

Analyzes the constitutional basis for "nonsense" speech acts in the context of First Amendment protections. Finds that meaningful and meaningless speech are intertwined, and that how words are used are important, not just how they relate to concepts beyond the words themselves.

Argues that Second Amendment doctrine can and should incorporate the longstanding and sensible American tradition of regulating guns more strictly in cities than in rural areas.

Argues that the Second Amendment should be read to encompass both the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense AND the right to protect oneself by avoiding them altogether, and shows what implications the latter right may have.

Argues that the State Attorneys General who advocated incorporation of the Second Amendment against the states owe more to popular constitutionalism than to federalism.

Uses free speech law to describe and predict what Heller’s categoricalism means for Second Amendment doctrine. Argues that the Court’s categorical line drawing creates intractable difficulties for Second Amendment doctrine and theory and that the majority’s categoricalism neither reflects nor enables a clear view of the Amendment’s underlying values, whatever they may be.