Michael Latner

Michael Steven Latner

Professor of Political Science, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo
Senior Fellow, Center for Science and Democracy, Union of Concerned Scientists
Chapter Member: California SSN

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About Michael

Latner's research focuses on electoral system design, voting rights and political representation. Overarching themes in Latner's writings include the political and policy consequences of institutional design, particularly the impact of electoral systems. Latner serves as Kendall Voting Rights Fellow for the Union of Concerned Scientists, and Faculty Scholar at the Institute for Advanced Technology and Public Policy at Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo.

Find out more at https://michaellatner.com/.


In the News

"California Students Can Help Renew Our Democratic Spirit. Here’s How," Michael Steven Latner, CALmatters, April 5, 2019.
"In its Latest Decision, the Supreme Court Has Got it Wrong when it Says that Partisan Gerrymandering Only Hurts Voters in Specific Districts," Michael Steven Latner (with Anthony J. McGann and Charles Anthony Smith), London School of Economics - US Centre, July 25, 2018.
"How the Supreme Court Made Gerrymandering Worse," Michael Steven Latner (with David Daley), Daily News, June 25, 2018.
"Supreme Court Ignores Science, Enables Voter Purging, But Data May Have Final Say," Michael Steven Latner, Union of Concerned Scientists,


Gerrymandering in America: The House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, and the Future of Popular Sovereignty (with Anthony J. McGann, Charles Anthony Smith, and Alex Keena) (Cambridge University Press, 2016).

Reveals how when the Supreme Court decided partisan gerrymandering was beyond judicial oversight, it radically altered the constraints on redistricting and allowed for greater partisan bias.

"Diagnosing Electoral Integrity" in Electoral Integrity in America: Securing Democracy, edited by Pippa Norris, Sarah Cameron and Thomas Wynter (Oxford University Press, 2018), 60-79.

Examines how the integrity of an election can be broken down into measurements. Quantifies the legitimacy, fairness, and accuracy of an election.

"The Calculus of Consensus Democracy" (with Anthony J. McGann). Comparative Political Studies 46, no. 7 (2013): 823-850.

Presents a theory of comparative political institutions based on the concept of consensus democracy and social choice theory. Argues that “consensus democracy” is not a special form of democracy characterized by mutual vetoes, but rather the simplest form of democracy, referred to as PR-majority rule. Constructs a typology of political institutions based on differences with this simple model.