Miller’s work focuses on democratization, democratic survival, and the effects of competitive elections in autocracies. Since much of U.S. foreign policy is concerned with encouraging regime change and reacting to the policies of autocracies, this has implications for how the U.S. designs democracy promotion and foreign aid conditionality. His other work touches on American voting behavior, election forecasting, and migration policy in autocracies.
Examines the reasons that people reported for arriving at the poll without identification during the 2016 Texas election.
Examines why the U.S. switches support from autocratic allies to democratic movements, focusing on American expectations of policy radicalism and alliance shifts after democratization.
Shows that heavier emigration from autocratic regimes to democracies encourages democratization, suggesting that looser immigration policies in the world’s democracies can promote the spread of democracy.
Shows that the combination of autocracy and elections has a long history, and while elections are only weakly related to democratization, they strongly predict democratic survival after transition. This implies that encouraging election adoption helps to secure democracy in the long run.
Shows that autocracies with multiparty elections have better outcomes (compared to non-electoral autocracies) in health, education, and gender equality. This implies that encouraging election adoption is a net positive when full democracy cannot be secured.