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Shai Vardi

Assistant Professor of Management Information Systems, Purdue University
Chapter Member: Indiana SSN
Areas of Expertise:
  • Science & Technology

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About Shai

Vardi's research focuses on game theory, mechanism design, and fair division. Overarching themes in Vardi's writings include applying game theoretic ideas to design solutions to real world problems in diverse areas such as elections and sports. 

In the News

"A Bipartisan Solution to Fix the Electoral College," Shai Vardi, The Hill, April 2, 2019.

Publications

"Dynamic Fair Resource Division," (with Christos-Alexandros Psomas and Eric Friedman), forthcoming 2019.

Designs an algorithm for obtaining the optimal fairness as a function of the amount of reallocation allowed.

"Reducing Tanking Incentives in the National Basketball Association," (with Aleksandr M. Kazachkov), forthcoming 2019.

Proposes a simple and implementable modification of the current system that would greatly reduce incentives for tanking, a phenomenon in which teams attempt to purposefully lose games. Shows that it not only greatly reduces incentives to tank but also produces an order of the teams that is closer to the true ranking than the current system does.

"Expanding the Battleground: A Bipartisan Approach to Presidential Election Reform," January 1, 2019.

Presents an alternative to the current system where battleground states make millions of dollars each presidential campaign, while the safe states get virtually nothing. Offers neither party an advantage over the current system, and safe states also reap the benefits of presidential elections by becoming relevant to the candidates.

"Non-Exploitable Protocols for Repeated Cake Cutting" (with Omer Tamuz and Juba Ziana). Proceedings of the 32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (2018): 1226-1233.

Defines a generalization of cut-and-choose protocols —forced-cut protocols— in which some cuts are made exogenously while others are made by the cutter, and show that there exist efficient non-exploitable forced-cut protocols.

"Local Computation Mechanism Design" (with Avinatan Hassidim and Yishay Mansour). ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation 4, no. 4 (2016): 1-24.

Designs local computation mechanisms - ones that run extremely quickly even when the input is very large, for a variety of classical game-theoretical problems.