Rosenfeld’s research focuses on economic inequality, political participation, and changes in the ways in which workers get paid. Current projects include an analysis of the broad consequences of labor union decline for American workers, an investigation into what voter turnout rates look like if we include the incarcerated among non-voters (with Becky Pettit, Jennifer Laird, and Bryan Sykes), and a federally-funded project on the consequences of pay-for-performance systems on inequality.
Examines whether the dissemination of organizational financial information shifts power dynamics within workplaces, finding that employees whose managers share financial information earn about 8 to 12 percent more than employees whose managers keep such information secret.
Utilizes the 2004 and 2011 series of the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) to test whether employees who report that their managers disclose workplace financial data earn more than otherwise similar workers not privy to such information. Suggests that disclosure results in higher wages for workers after adjusting for profit and productivity levels and a range of other workplace and worker characteristics. Argues that disclosure is a key resource that reduces information asymmetries, thereby providing legitimacy to workers’ claims in wage bargaining.