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Denice’s work focuses on education and labor market inequality in the U.S. Specifically, he is interested in the ways in which the quantity and quality of education one attains affect earnings and other labor market outcomes, circuitous and nontraditional pathways through education, how policies and procedures in the workplace impact employee pay and satisfaction, and how public education policies and reforms alleviate or exacerbate unequal access to high quality schools. In 2013, the American Enterprise Institute and the Thomas B. Fordham Institute named Denice an Emerging Education Policy Scholar. Denice is also a research analyst at the University of Washington’s Center on Reinventing Public Education, where he focuses on the opportunities and inequalities related to school choice policies in K-12 public education.
Analyzes three years of enrollment and school application data to examine what parents are looking for when selecting public schools for their children, how such preferences vary across socio-demographic groups, and whether a centralized enrollment system can alleviate some of the problems identified by prior work on school choice.
Draws from qualitative data - including interviews with parents as well as school and district leaders - this paper highlights the successes and lingering challenges of implementing a system of school choosing that aims to be more centralized, transparent, and accessible than the fragmented system that existed previously.
Discusses the expansion of the higher education market through open-access schools (like for-profit institutions) and how it has given traditionally disadvantaged students the opportunity to attend college. Argues that for-profit students who either don’t complete a degree or earn a two-year degree do not earn more in wages than those with only a high school diploma.
Examines whether the dissemination of organizational financial information shifts power dynamics within workplaces, finding that employees whose managers share financial information earn about 8 to 12 percent more than employees whose managers keep such information secret.