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Evgenia Gorina

Associate Professor of Public and Nonprofit Management, The University of Texas at Dallas
Chapter Leader: Dallas-Fort Worth SSN
Areas of Expertise:

About Evgenia

Gorina's research focuses on studying government financial sustainability at the subnational level and includes work on city fiscal health, financial reserves accumulation and use, retirement system funding and reform as well as includes work on migration and its economic and social effects. Gorina's research has been funded by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board and Mercatus Center at George Mason University.

In the News

"Environmental Sustainability Adoption and Financial Management in U.S. Cities," Evgenia Gorina (with Doug Goodman, Romeo Abraham, and Brett Cease), Portland State Sustainability,
"Using Fiscal Ratios to Predict Local Fiscal Distress," Evgenia Gorina (with Marc Joffe and Craig Maher), Urban Economics, April 24, 2018.
"Broke Cities," Evgenia Gorina (with Craig Maher), U.S. News, January 3, 2017.

Publications

"Voters, Neighbors, and City Performance in Environmental Sustainability Transitions" (with Doug Goodman, Romeo Abraham, Brett Cease, and P. Edward French). Public Integrity (2022).

Points at a non-neutral role of social factors in sustainability transitions and suggest that cities pursuing the environmental mission can withstand tough economic times without substantial performance tradeoffs.

"Pension Reforms and Public Sector Turnover " (with Trang Hoang). Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 30, no. 1 (2019): 96–112.

Examines changes in public sector workforce turnover in response to the reforms of state retirement systems and found that, on average, a pension reform was associated with a four percent increase in turnover, with stronger effects in states with higher shares of college-educated workers in the public sector.

"Toward a Theory of Fiscal Slack" (with Craig Maher and Sungho Park). Public Budgeting and Finance 39, no. 4 (2019): 48-74.

Observes that cities with more volatile revenues and cities with stable revenues hold about the same resources in reserve funds. Shows that cities with a wealthier tax base tend to have higher fiscal reserves.